These definitions are structured on the basis of two elements: on the one hand, the existence and conflict of two or more competing interests and, on the other, the position (and the dilemma) of a person whose duty it is to balance these interests and finally resolve their conflict by promoting only one of them at the expense of the others. Given that the decision on which interest to promote is one resting upon the discretionary power of one sole person and his own personal integrity and criteria, one might reasonably expect such a decision not to be perfectly impartial, "but to some extent influenced by the person's own preferences and interests. Furthermore, at this point we may introduce the third: the additional parameter of interdependence of interests the factor which may affect in a determinative way the deciding person's discretion and, hence, the very resolution of the conflict itself.
EQUITY AND CONFLICT: BASIC RULES
The framework of rules applying to the problem of conflicts of interest and their resolution was built on the basis of the rules governing the o o nature and operation of the fiduciary relationship. The rules on fiduciaries and fiduciary obligations have evolved through time, starting from a general catch-all duty of the fiduciary to act in the best interests of the beneficiary and developed to a framework of prohibitive rules which stipulate the actions which fiduciaries cannot take, the factors by which the fiduciaries cannot be influenced and the results that the fiduciaries' actions cannot have. Thus, the content of the fiduciary obligation is clarified on the basis of two fundamental prohibitions: the 'no-profit and no-conflict' rules.
WHY ARE CONFLICTS SO COMPLEX AND ACUTE?
The intense pressures of competition have led the key players in the world of financial services such as commercial and investment banks, accounting and consulting ' O O firms to a rapid process of restructuring or in the direction of offering an ever wider variety of more complicated and more 'profitable' financial products and services. This restructuring process is basically characterised by a qualitative and a quantitative dimension, i.e. a tendency for growth in seize through consolidation, as well as diversification, in the nature of services offered through the combination of various financial functions offering various products.
The aim of consolidation is, on the one hand, to cut down the operating costs of the industry and create economies of scale, and, on the other, to create competitive advantages by enlarging as much as possible a firm's clientele which means both a wider target market for cross-selling, but also a wider spectrum of information possessed by one single firm about market conditions and prospects (which in the financial market means better quality). Similarly, diversification aims to exploit the obvious market advantages of concentrating and offering the widest possible range of products and services in one single financial conglomerate (the so-called 'financial supermarket' or 'money mall').
The effects of these tendencies have made a rapid appearance in the sector. After a strong wave of mergers and acquisitions leading to consolidation in the investment banking industry, the global market for financial services is today dominated by a small number of large international investment banks. At the same time, the larger the firms get, the wider the variety of services o ' J they offer.
In the absence of restrictive regulation in countries such as the UK and Germany, the dominating model is that of the universal bank providing all kinds of services, ranging from retail and corporate banking, to investment banking, corporate finance services, investment advice, asset management, operation of unit trusts and mutual funds, and even insurance services. The fact that the Financial 
TYPES OF CONFLICT IN CONGLOMERATES
A general overview of the types of conflict which may arise within today's financial conglomerates identifies four basic groups on the basis of the form in which they are structured. clients. I will not deal with any issues of insider trading that arise in this context.
THE CHINESE WALL
The basic structural means that modern financial conglomerates have adopted to manage conflicts of informational advantages is the o Chinese wall, a metaphor describing a set of rules, regulations, procedures and physical arrangements adopted by a firm in order to prevent confidential information from flowing from one of its departments to the other (see Larry Yarn, 'The Multi-service Securities Firm and the Chinese Wall: A New Look in the Light of the Federal Securities Code', 63 Nebr L Rev 197, at 210), thus minimising the risk of abuse of this information for the benefit of the firm itself or of other clients who should not be allowed to access it.
A Chinese wall is usually set up in order to separate information-source departments (investment and commercial banking and, possibly, the specialist department) from those which can convert the information into a financial benefit for the firm or its clients, such as the securities trading or the trust department. Thus the wall is an internal device, operating within the structure and hierarchy of a firm and affecting virtually only its internal operations.
In general the wall is considered as serving a prophylactic function, in the sense that it prevents the interdepartmental flow of information within the firm. However, its wide adoption in the industry, combined with its 
THE REGULATORY POSITION
I shall try to address briefly the regulatory position as at this moment of transition by looking at the old Conduct of Business Rules, with the reminder that the Financial Services and Markets Bill is intended to replace the current FSA 1986 during 2000/2001 (having now received Royal Assent on 14 June) and new regulatory rules are expected to be introduced by the Financial Services Authority and to replace the Core Rules.
Indeed, General Principle 6 states that a firm should either avoid any conflict of interest arising, or should ensure 'fair treatment for all its customers by disclosure, internal rules of confidentiality, declining to act or otherwise', as well as that the firm should not unfairly place its interests above those of its customers, especially where a properly informed customer would not expect it to do so. Apparently 'internal rules of confidentiality' refer to Chinese wall policies. In the same spirit, Core Rule 2 prohibits a firm from knowingly entering a conflict of interest o situation in relation to a transaction, by either advising or dealing, unless the firm takes reasonable steps to ensure fair treatment for the customer. Thus, a firm may either take measures to prevent a conflict situation from arising, or deal with the conflict by adopting the appropriate measures for ensuring that its customers are fairly treated.
Rule 36 of the RSA's Conduct of Business Rules actually endorses the Chinese wall as a measure affording protection to a firm without the need to obtain the customer's consent where information has not crossed the wall.
The first paragraph of the rule permits the withholding of information obtained by one part of the firm from the persons with whom it deals (clients) in the course of carrying out another part of its business, as well as those of its employees who are dealing with the same clients in the other part of the firm's business, as long as such parts involve investment or related business. In addition, in its second paragraph, the rule confirms the same rule of isolation of information among different associates of a business group, reiterating that what is known to one company in a group may not be transmitted to other companies of the same group despite any obligations imposed by other Core Rules, as long as a Chinese wall policy is in operation (see Michael Blair, Financial Services: The New Core Rules, (Blackstone, London 1991) at 138).
The third and fourth paragraphs to the rule have a supplemental function to the main provisions of the first two paragraphs. Thus, the fourth paragraph reiterates the protection offered to a firm that has adopted a Chinese wall scheme in accordance with the Core Rules against the potential imposition of liability by the anti-fraud provision of s. 47 of the Financial Services Act, mainly operating as an explanation to s. 48(6) of the Act.
At the same time, the third paragraph confirms the protection afforded to a firm that has adopted a Chinese wall, by addressing the problem of attribution of knowledge, in relation to other Conduct of Business Rules, the application of which depends upon knowledge on the part of the firm, and it does so through the introduction of a presumption that the firm will not be taken to act in knowledge when none of its employees involved on behalf of it acts with knowledge. Furthermore, it is also made clear that the Chinese wall arrangements should be designed not only to seek to prevent the passage of information but in order to detect when there may have been a breach and to remedy any breach to the extent possible. Finally, in view of the fact that it is impracticable for firms to raise Chinese walls within their trading departments between every trader, it is suggested that other methods of demonstrating effective control of information would be necessary and might involve firms in J O setting up new systems to evidence information control.
According to the Law Commission

FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS BILL
THE COURTS' APPROACH
We shall now examine the approach of courts to the Chinese
The issue of corporate knowledge
The traditional case law concept of attribution of knowledge to the o corporate entity is based on the notion that a corporation has one single mind to which any knowledge possessed by all its departments, branches or employees is attributed. Thus, this abstract single corporate mind knows and possesses any information in any part of the firm, however large the firm or however detailed or complex the information may be. Such an approach apparently has significant consequences for the issue of attribution of liability to a company on the basis of knowledge of certain facts for establishing fraud or negligence.
In the context of financial services, a unified mind of an investment bank 23 will be deemed to possess all confidential information possessed by its underwriting branch, its specialist branch as well as its M&A branch. Thus, the investment management or the brokers and dealers branch of an investment bank will be legally considered as being in possession of any confidential information disclosed, i.e. to the employees of the corporate finance department doing a due diligence
exercise in a company before the public offering of its securities. ([1995] 1 AC 456; [1995] 1 All ER 135), have adopted a context-specific approach by considering persons who, regardless of their positions in the company hierarchy act on behalf of the company in specific transactions, as consequently the ones who represent the company's mind and will in that specific transaction.
On this basis, a company's mind and will is formulated as a contextspecific concept. In view of the vast size and complex structure of firms and the huge number of transactions performed every day or every minute on behalf of a firm in the financial services industry, such a contextspecific approach appears as a fair and possibly necessary mitigation of a stringent and inflexible rule which only causes dogmatic complications.
In any case, trying to attribute to some abstract company brain all the knowledge held by all agents' 'departments' would lead to an absurdum, as on one hand it has now been admitted both from a dogmatic and from a practical and realistic point of view that the mind of a company is not a conceptual metaphor but the actual mind of its agents (and nobody in a firm could be in a position to know practically everything), while on the other hand such a collective attribution would be inconsistent with the context-specific approach, which in terms of corporate liability requires the company mind to be that of the person carrying out the specific transaction on behalf of the company. The above seems to be in line with the current regulatory position under Core Rule 36.3, which, as already analysed, virtually introduces a presumption that the firm will not be taken to act in knowledge when none of its employees involved on behalf of it, acts with knowledge.
' o I think that in this respect the Conduct of Business Rules actually endorse a form of split or departmental knowledge by way of a presumption which in some way bypasses the application of the aforementioned rigid principles of common law, but nevertheless operates only in relation to particular other Core rules. In any case, by their regulatory nature, the Conduct of Business Rules cannot actually resolve the problem of attribution of knowledge which does, in my opinion, have to be addressed through statutory provisions of the new FSMA.
Adequacy of the Chinese wall
Before we look at case law on the adequacy of the Chinese wall we have to remark that the main bulk of relevant Commonwealth case law is limited to cases involving law firms and just a few cases of accounting firms, while no investment bank cases have attracted any serious attention on the matter so far.
One should always keep in mind in connection with law firm cases that in view of the special nature of the lawyer-to-client relationship and the position of the solicitor as an officer of the court, the approach of courts to the concept of Chinese walls in the law firm context has been fairly strict.
Indeed a significant degree of scepticism characterises the courts' views on how acceptable it may be to allow law firms to act in situations of conflict by representing clients with directly or even potentially conflicting interests and whether a Chinese wall can efficiently protect the confidentiality of information within the same firm and thus preserve the impartiality of action of the firm. In Supasave Retail v Coward Chance in 1991, the court appeared sufficiently sceptical towards the efficiency of the Chinese wall to remark that 'once the possession of confidential information by a firm of solicitors has been established, the erection of a Chinese wall will be regarded as inadequate protection for the interests of the former client', noting that there is always an element of seepage of confidential information in a firm or a group through casual chatter and discussion. The court adopted a test based on three questions in particular: whether confidential information is held which, if disclosed, may affect the former clients interests; whether there is a real or appreciable risk that such information will be disclosed ;and whether the discretionary power of the court to intervene should be exercised in view of the significance of the special fiduciary relationship.
Before we turn to the approach adopted in Prince Jefri, we should reiterate that in view of the special nature of the solicitor's position, the courts should be very cautious in adopting the principles formulated in law firm cases to different contexts, such as that of financial services.
It is a fact that, so far, the authorities on the issue of the adequacy of the Chinese wall are limited to the law firm context. However, a direct transfer of principles applicable to law firms to a different context such as that of an investment bank or an accounting o firm could give rise to problems oi inconsistency. The difficulty involved in applying solicitors' Chinese walls precedents to different contexts becomes obvious to the reader of the Prince Jefri decisions, looking at the number of the authorities considered and the court's approach to their construction and their application in the specific case. Setting aside the long analysis of precedents, in both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords decisions, I shall attempt to examine the core of the rationale of the decisions.
In my opinion, the fundamental question on the basis of which the Prince Jefri case was judged was whether and to what extent the measures taken by KPMG to protect the confidential information possessed could be considered in the particular case as adequate to protect its confidentiality.
It should be emphasised that this question was placed in concrete in view of the adequacy of the particular Chinese wall that was adopted by KPMG in this specific case. Indeed the Court of Appeal considered the specific arrangements as adequate to protect the confidential information by adopting the Russell v Tower Corporation test of three questions stated above. On the other hand, their Lordships rejected the Tower test and were of the view that the specific measures taken by KPMG were not in the particular case adequate to preserve the confidentiality of information.
The decision of the Court of Appeal does not leave any doubt as to the court's views on the adequacy of the Chinese wall, given the fact that the court expressed its satisfaction that the wall was sufficiently adequate 25 to ensure that there was no real or appreciable risk of inadvertent disclosure of information.
On the other hand, although the (3) It was established that a number of KPMG's employees had actually worked with both of the teams that were working on the conflicting projects and had thus effectively been transferred over the wall.
I would disagree with several commentators who have argued that Prince Jefri has not brought significant changes as far as the adequacy of the Chinese wall is concerned. My personal view is that the importance of the case is dual. On the one hand, the concept of the Chinese wall was for the first time judicially endorsed as an effective means of legal defence in connection with breach of fiduciary duties, as both the decision of the Court of Appeal directly, as well as the decision of the House of Lords indirectly by argumentum a contrario, endorse the concept of a permanently-established and properly-operating Chinese wall that effectively separates different departments of a firm. On the other hand, in the House of Lords decision, Lord Millett actually considered industry standards as to the proper construction and operation of the Chinese wall within a firm, giving an indication that the adequacy of a Chinese wall can and will be evaluated on the basis of certain standards crystallised in practice within a specific industry.
Efficiency as a legal defence
The question of whether the new Financial Services and Markets Act should provide specific guidance as to the proper construction and operation of the Chinese wall in order for it to be accepted by the courts as an effective means of legal defence is an issue that requires significant consultation with the financial services industry.
My own view is that the FSMA should endorse the Chinese wall as an efficient legal defence, by referring the evaluation of its practical adequacy to clearly set and identifiable standards, formulated in accordance with the practice of the financial services industry and incorporated in the new core conduct of business rules to be drafted further to the enactment of the act. ®
George Barboutis
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Addendum
In the article by Olosuji Elias entitled 'The impact of globalisation on human rights', Amicus Curiae, Issue 28, June 2000, pp. 19 23, the reference to Globalization and the Postmodern Turn on p. 23 should read: 'http://wvwv.gseis.uc/ at p. 2'.
